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Responses to Marti

Michael G. Vater
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Doctor Marti is to be commended for compressing such a rich
variety of historical reminders and flashes of philosophical insight
within the scope of his brief and suggestive paper. Among the
important reminders culled from the tradition are, first of all, the
pivotal importance of St. Augustine's fusion of philosophical
inwardness and Christian doctrine, then a correct and careful
estimation of Kant's location of the ethically active self within the
noumenal order, and finally a lucid synthesis of Schelling's insights
into the possibility of a philosophical religion. Marti understands that to
repeat the tradition philosophically is to renew and restore it. But he
also brings novel insights to bear upon the Kantian-Hegelian tradition,
the most striking of which are the assertions that the work of
ratiocination (Verstand) is guesswork, and that obligation becomes
objective only in and with the act of taking responsibility. Each of
these gems deserves to be cut, polished, and set within its own
extended treatment.
Marti's "Last Objectivism" is an allusive paper, a tissue of
glimmering insights, not an argumentative exposition. Accordingly, I
find I must, perhaps contrary to Marti's spirit and method, prosaically
list what I take to be his claims before I can reply. I am not perfectly
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confident that I have understood all the nuances of his position, but
the following seem to be his major contentions:
(1) Both the self and God are "entities" of the same sort, that is,
non-entities, non-substances, non-actors. Each is a creative agency, a
relationality, and an outcropping of spontaneity, and each is
fundamentally for the other.
(2) The self lives "in God." Its freedom, inwardness and selfidentity are apparently limitations of, instances of-or better-qualities
and events evoked by their divine counterparts.
(3) Ratiocination or analytic intellect can only reify both self and
deity in its attempt to explain, analyze, and establish conditional
relationships between conditioned objects. Reason can intuit or
"sense" in a non-objectivistic manner, and is thus fitted for cognizing
the unconditional.
(4) A "religion of reason" ought to be confined to the individual
self's recognition of divine or creative acts and its creative response to
them (for example, will to truth in thinking, acceptance of moral
responsibility), accompanied by the recognition of ultimate spontaneity
or freedom as in some sense their source.
Ad (1): A dialectic of devotion and idolatry is involved in every
attempt to name the divine, for the human spirit simultaneously feels
itself elevated above itself and yet tempted to understand and control
the power that tears it out of the ordinary. Marti rightly stresses the
moment of negative theology in the pious use of intellect, as did
Aquinas and Cusanus. But perhaps he is extreme. Schelling's notion of
the infinite non-objectivity of the absolute makes sense only in the
context of a philosophy of nature and of spirit wherein the absolute is
seen to objectify or give form to itself and thus become a subject that
suffers and enjoys a finite world. Marti's negative theology seems to
divorce the object of religious devotion and intellectual contemplation
from any specific or describable relation to worldly being, precisely as
the price for not blasphemously ascribing conditional predicates to the
divine. In simply and ultimately contrasting the conditional and the
unconditional, Marti veers toward the paradox Plato voiced in
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Parmenides 133a-134e; if we simplistically conceive the divine as
sheer otherness, then religious phenomena such as trust in
providence, care, and devotion go out the window - things which Marti,
I suspect, would find essential to religion.
As for his suggestion that we abolish the grammar of "self,"
"person," and "spirit," allowing only "I," "you," and the devotional
pronoun "God" in their stead, I find the idea not only awkward but
misleading. The pure "I," Fichte's spontaneous self-positing, Kant's
noumenal agent which comes to itself only in recognizing and
accepting moral responsibility, exists nowhere but in a finite setting,
and apprehends and acts only within a finite history of objective
circumstances. The "I" of Fichte's and the young Schelling's
transcendental idealism is indeed not "of this world," but it certainly is
in this world. Hegel rightly saw that spirit first comes to itself as a
return from and out of a world that is both objective and, at least in its
general features, rational. To divorce "reason" and the objectivity of
the world in so pronounced a manner as Marti does perhaps invites the
equation of religion with emotionalism and anti-intellectualism.
Ad (2): Marti reproduces most of the ambiguities of Schelling's
doctrine of God, which cannot conveniently be labeled either theism or
pantheism, or said to stress consistently divine immanence over
transcendence or the reverse. But ratiocinative convenience is not
what is at stake in philosophy of religion, as Marti correctly sees.
Schelling's theology was anthropological in its method: In one sense,
self qua spirit lives "in God," or it is God that acts in the self; in
another sense, what makes the self its own self blinds its vision of its
divine ground of possibility and tempts it to its fall into singularity. But
in the moment of religious recognition, the self wills that it not be God,
that God be more than its philosophical idea, that God be the "Lord of
being," that is, the absolutely free one, consequently the liberator. All
of this follows from the interrelation of the human and the divine which
Schelling builds into his doctrine of the Creation: "Created from the
source of things and kindred to it, the human soul has a con-science
(Mitwissenschaft) of the Creation. This knowledge encloses the
supreme lucidity of all things, and it is not so much the cognitive
(wissend) agent as it is science itself." (Nachlassband 5).
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If we object that these Schellingian assertions all fudge on the
question of the identity or non-identity of the self and the deity, Marti
would maintain, I think, that the religious relation is what is central to
religion, that God is pure relation, secure of self and caring of others,
and so radically free and malleable as to be free from being anything
at all. As Charles Hartshorne has argued so clearly, divine
transcendence is not well described in terms of immutability, identity
and disrelation, but is better defined as an unsurpassable degree of
sensitivity to, care for, and harmonious interadjustment of, finite
beings. But while process theologians thus define the consequent deity
as the limit case of affectivity, Marti seems more successful in
preserving the traditional notion of God's infinity with his insistence
that freedom is the mark of transcendence. His inspiration, Schelling,
despite his persistent taste for metaphysical monism, had managed to
preserve the "distance" required of orthodox theism and the centrality
of the concept of the Creation to Christian thinking when he observed
of the God-human relation, " ... there is love neither in indifference nor
where opposites are combined which require the combination in order
to be; but rather . . . this is the secret of love, that it unites such
beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can
be without the other." (7 :408).
Ad (3): Throughout the paper, Marti employs the Kantian
distinction of reason and ratiocination in many varied, and some
distinctly non-Kantian, senses. In general, they parallel Schelling's
distinction between "intellectual intuition" and discursive intellect, or
Hegel's more subtle distinction between reason and reflection. At
various points Marti contrasts reason and ratiocination as,
respectively:
thinking with necessity
Platonic epistémé
action
sensing or intuitlng
will to truth
grasping what ought to be

versus
versus
versus
versus
versus
versus

guessing at possibilities
Platonic doxa and orthé doxa
comprehension
explanation
guesslllg
grasping what is

With all this terminological slippage, it is not clear whether reason's
function is to think, or to intuit, or to act, nor whether ratiocination's
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task is really to explain or ignorantly to latch onto the first pseudoexplanation available. One can infer that for Marti the telling contrast
is between the "reason" that intuits the unconditional (self, freedom,
God) and the ratiocinative processes suited to explaining finite things.
Yet when Marti says things such as, "the real question is not whether I
dream or am awake, but whether or not I am alive," he seems to
simply juxtapose reason and ratiocination as the practical and the
theoretical spheres. He aims, in good Kantian (but nonetheless
philosophically disputable) fashion, to isolate his claims about the
uniqueness of the mental, freedom, and God's existence from all
theoretical inspection. Paradoxically, the objects of reason are made
incomprehensible, located beyond the reach of thought. In 1802
Schelling himself denounced such moves as "fear of reason." (4:308).
It is plain that I do not find the whole of Marti's critique of
objectivism compelling, but I am struck by the wisdom of his remark
that ratiocination guesses. Indeed it does, but cogently, consistently,
and methodically—yet somehow always merely hovering on the
surface, for causal or nomic interrelation is ultimately non-knowing,
non-comprehension, the flight from one item to another, a merely
conditional cognition of the conditioned. But such cognition guesses
and errs in another way as well. The will to explain is often
accompanied by the will to accept an explanation, and the history of
philosophy is littered with repetitions of the same basic fallacy, the
acceptance of a partial or one-sided account as a complete
explanation. Since Hegel we have become a bit more suspicious and
Popperian, but "all-sidedness" is an elusive goal—for philosophy as
well as for science.
Ad (4): As for Marti's contention that "the religious soul is
satisfied with the acta Dei and with the recognition of God as 'Lord'," I
shall merely translate some remarks (which Wallace failed to provide
us and) which Hegel made in introducing the second and third editions
of the Encyclopaedia. Hegel was as concerned as Marti is about the
damage that abstractive intellect could do to religious life, yet he was
equally adamant about rejecting an anti-theoretical "religion of the
heart" as an alternative. In the second Preface Hegel says:
In recent times religion has ever more contracted the expansive
domain of its contents and withdrawn into the intensive
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dimension of piety or feeling, oftentimes indeed into such a form
as manifests a very impoverished and barren substance. But as
long as religion has a creed, a doctrine, a dogmatics, it has the
same concerns as philosophy has, and the latter is as such
capable of being united with religion in these concerns. . . .
Genuine religion, the religion of spirit, must have such a creed,
a content; spirit is essentially conscious, so its content is
fashioned from the objective; on the level of feeling, spirit is the
content itself, but not objective (it is simply anguished, to use a
phrase of Jacob Boehme); feeling is but the basest level of
consciousness, indeed one located in the form of soul common
to the animals. Thought first transforms soul, with which the
animal too is endowed, into spirit, and philosophy is just a
consciousness of this content, spirit and its truth, precisely in
the form and manner of this its essence; for it is thought which
distinguished spirit from the animal and makes spirit capable of
religion. The contracted religiosity which is narrowed down to
the one point of "heart" must make broken-heartedness and
brokenness essential moments of its rebirth; at the same time it
must remember that religion's concern is with the heart of a
spiritual being, that mind is ordained to be master of the heart,
and that this mastery is possible only insofar as spirit itself is
reborn. This rebirth of spirit out of natural ignorance and natural
error takes place through instruction and through the sort of
belief in objective truth, in the substantial contents, which
follows upon the testimony of spirit. (Nicolin and Poeggeler
edition, pp. 12-13; translation mine).
In the third Preface, Hegel discusses the general state of
contemporary religious life and links the decay of religious life with the
decline of philosophy itself:
This poverty of scientific and, in general, intellectual content is
what separates this piety from the position it directly makes the
object of its accusation and condemnation. The enlightenment of
the understanding emptied religion of all content through its
formal, abstract, contentless thinking, just the way that piety
does with its reduction of the Faith to the watchword, "Lord,
Lord." Therein neither position has any advantage over the
other and, inasmuch as these antagonists coincide, there is
nothing substantial at hand wherein they could come into
contact with one another, find a common ground, secure the
possibility of investigating this ground, and finally bring it to the
point of knowledge and truth .... Enlightenment theology
remained entrenched in this formalism of the negative and of
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freedom, and filled out the content of this freedom according to
its whim and fancy, so that, on the whole, it was unconcerned
about its own contents. But for that very reason, Enlightenment
can do no violence to the content of the Faith, since the
Christian community must be and evermore ought to be united
through the bond of a doctrinal outline, a creed. In contrast, the
generalities and abstractions of the stagnant, not living, waters
of rationalistic understanding will not admit the specificity of a
self-determined and articulated Christian content or body of
doctrine. Meanwhile, the other position, relying on its cry of
"Lord, Lord," bluntly and outspokenly rejects the completion of
the development of faith into spirit, substance, and truth ....
Because the rich, profound content of the most sublime and
unconditional interests of human nature has decayed and
religiosity, the pious together with the reflective, has sunk to
the point of discovering its greatest satisfaction in lack of
content, philosophy has become an accidental and subjective
need. These unconditional interests have been conformed by
both sorts of religiosity to nothing more than superficial
explanation that it no longer requires philosophy to satisfy these
interests; indeed, philosophy is held, and rightly so, to be
destructive of these newly created satisfactions and of such a
finely cultivated sort of gratification. Philosophy is thus entirely
left to the voluntary and subjective desires of the individual.
(op. cit., pp. 26-27; translation mine).
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